The following letter to the CHRT by Marc Lemire’s lawyer, Barbara Kulaszka, hits on some very important points. However, as something that is becoming par for the course, the Human Rights Racket has some real bias problems when its judges are also so-called human rights activists in previous careers. Pay attention to Kulaszka’s reference to the Tribunal judge in Lemire’s case, Athanasios Hadjis’, previous HR gig.
It’s quite disturbing that you have someone who presumes to sit as Judge in a case dealing with free speech vs. so-called human rights issues when his previous gig was joining in a coalition with one of the most interested parties to the HR sham, the Canadian Jewish Congress! And if that is not the worst of it, the CJC is also an interested party to the Warman v. Lemire case, the same case Hadjis “presides” over!
The brazen judicial incest of it all is mind boggling.
Nov 26, 1997 – COALITION DENOUNCES PARIZEAU’S REMARKS
MONTREAL, NOVEMBER 26, 1997-– The Coalition of the Greek, Italian and Jewish Congresses of Quebec strongly denounced the remarks made by former Quebec Premier Jacques Parizeau during a conference held in Edmonton, in which he blamed these organizations for the narrow referendum defeat of October 30, 1995.
Jack Jedwab Executive Director Canadian Jewish Congress Quebec Region cell: (514) 232-6295
Athanasios Hadjis Vice-President Hellenic Congress of Quebec (514) 849-3526
May 21, 2008
Re: Warman v. Lemire, Tribunal No. T1073/5405
To the Tribunal:
This is the response of the motion filed by the Canadian Association for Free Expression Inc.:
1. Reasonable Apprehension of Bias:
The motion by CAFÉ raises the problem of the inherent and systemic bias of members of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal. People are appointed to the Tribunal because they have “sensitivity” to human rights pursuant to section 48.1 of the CHRA. Thus, the activity of the Chair in this case working with ethnic organizations and being part of ethnic organizations is not seen as a negative but as a reason why he would be appointed to this position.
There is a “human rights industry” and people who are part of this milieu are appointed to the Tribunal.
This does not mean that members are bad people or malicious towards others but it leads to a bias that simply is not recognized by its members.
Making arguments for freedom of speech in this milieu is like someone going to a feminist conference and arguing for the benefits to society of women staying home, making nutritious food for their children from scratch and home-schooling them. They would not be laughed out of the conference, they would be tarred and feathered as “dangers” to the progress of women’s rights. The feminists would not recognize their own biases or arrogance.
The respondent supports CAFÉ’s submissions that there is a reasonable apprehension of bias because of this, but he also recognizes that all members of the Tribunal would have equally biased backgrounds as a result of the appointment requirements. There is therefore no benefit to another member hearing either the motion or the case.
However, the actions of this Tribunal since January have caused increasing concern to the respondent.
The entire burden of arguing for a resumption of the hearing was put on the respondent. Only one day was scheduled for the hearing. A massive disclosure was made by the Commission after March 25th, yet this Tribunal constantly reiterates that the “case is done.”
The Commission announced blithely at the
March 25th hearing that it had a policy of not disclosing the fact that investigators were using pseudonyms and signing onto message boards, including the Freedomsite, in contempt of the Tribunal’s rules, yet the Tribunal has continued to insist that final arguments will be due in two weeks even as disclosure is still being made and rulings on redactions not issued. The Chair has done so in the face of the respondent’s stated intent to the Tribunal that he reserves the right to move for further evidence after receiving the original unredacted documents.
I note for the record that I received more disclosure from the Commission last week.
The refusal of the Tribunal to allow the Canadian Constitution Foundation to have interested party status was also deeply prejudicial to the respondent and to the Canadian public. Section 13 is a violation of freedom of speech, as held in Taylor. The CCF could have greatly assisted the Tribunal in the resolution of whether it is justified under section 1 of the Charter today.
This case became in essence a new case when the Commission decided, in the face of a judicial review before the Federal Court, to reveal that it has been using pseudonyms to post messages on message boards and to contact respondents and, further, to reveal its relationship with police services.
This resulted in the opening up of new disclosures and new avenues of evidence regarding issues which go to the heart of the constitutional arguments. The Commission is exchanging information with the police in a manner which could violate the rights of Canadians under section 7 and section 11 of the Charter.
The respondent is entitled to pursue this evidence, both through disclosure and the calling of evidence.
It is the hope of the respondent that the Tribunal will recognize that the Commission’s failure to abide by the Tribunal’s rules regarding disclosure in all of the section 13 cases, and the revelation of this fact on
March 25th, is a fundamental change in this case that must be dealt with.